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PUBLIC PERCEPTION, JUSTICE, AND
THE "SEARCH FOR TRUTH" IN
CRIMINAL CASES
CRAIG M. BRADLEY* and JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN**
THE MICKEY MOUSE CORPORATION
To: All Employees
From: R. Dangerfield, V.P. for Marketing and Attorney-at-Large
As I'm sure you're all aware, we have been successful in our bid
to take over the criminal trial system of the State of California as part
of the Legislature's "privatization" move. We have paid a lot of
money for this, and now it's up to all of you to work together to make
this venture a success. Let me run a few ideas up the flagpole and see
if anyone salutes.
First, I know that a lot of people say the criminal justice system
"failed" in the O.J. Simpson trial. This claim is duck poop! How can
a show with ratings like that be considered a "failure"? Thus, it must
be our policy not to "change the criminal trial system," as pointy-
headed academics might urge, but to free the system of those remain-
ing constraints that might cut into future ratings success.
Above all, we must recognize that a continued supply of celebrity
defendants is not something we can depend upon. (Note to Psychology
Department: Is there anything we can do to ensure a steady supply of
big-name defendants? How about a series of TV specials on how to
murder your wife (husband, girlfriend, boss, etc.) and get away with
it? Will celebrity victims suffice in the absence of celebrity defend-
ants?) Accordingly, we have to ensure that the trial is entertaining in
* James Louis Calamaras Professor of Law, Indiana University at Bloomington. (For-
merly, Assistant United States Attorney, Washington D.C.)
** Professor of Law and John S. Hastings Faculty Fellow, Indiana University at
Bloomington.
The authors would like to thank Lynne Henderson, Aviva Orenstein, Lauren Robel, and
Alex Tanford for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
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its own right, rather than depend on celebrity "guest stars" for our
ratings.
For starters, we need to change our idea of what a trial is! We
must bag, once and for all, the outmoded notion that a trial is a som-
ber "search for truth." Surely no one believes that old chestnut after
witnessing the Simpson melodrama-complete with a villain, buffoons
(the LAPD), hired guns (the defense attorneys), sympathetic victims,
secret never-revealed evidence and court jesters (the "expert" wit-
nesses). (Note to self: Hire Judge Ito as a consultant on this one.)
Instead, do not regard the Simpson trial as just the pilot for a
series of exciting trials, but see it as the beginning of a reconceptual-
ization' of the entire criminal justice system. Let's face it, folks-with
the exception of a few famous trials, the criminal justice system is dull,
DULL, DULL!
Once we accept that the criminal trial has nothing to do with a
"search for truth," many of the hidebound notions that currently con-
strict trials' popularity could be lifted. (To give credit where it's due,
the Supremes took the first giant step in this direction by allowing TV
coverage of trials.) For example, the concept of a "jury" is much too
narrow. Instead, the "finder of fact" should be the entire studio audi-
ence. (Note to self: Potential audience members should be screened
according to their willingness to wear silly costumes and engage in
outrageous behavior on camera. If they have a grudge against one of
the participants that they are willing to vent on camera, so much the
better.) In order to gain a conviction, the prosecutor must score over
ninety percent on the Applause-O-Meter.
Instead of only the lawyers being allowed to ask questions, the
audience, spurred on by the emcee (formerly known as the judge),
should be allowed to shout questions at any time. (Note to Props De-
partment: Should the audience be allowed to fling rotten vegetables at
the parties if they are dissatisfied, or would that just be too icky? How
about simulated rotten vegetables?) However, the bailiff should at-
tempt to squelch questioning by anyone who seems to be acting too
serious. (Note to Wardrobe Department: look into suitable bailiff cos-
tumes. See if Nixon White House guard suits are still available. How
about scarlet and ermine for judge's robes-very Rumpolean.) To
1. I realize that this word is too long. In the future, legal commentary on criminal cases
should be limited to one and two syllable words, A la Mickey Spillane: "They claimed that the ex-
jock, Mr. All-America, croaked his skirt with a shiv. But Mike Cochran ("Johnnie" is too fey)
would show it was a put up job."
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maintain a sense of historic continuity, the "judge" should be en-
couraged to bang his gavel a lot. Arrivals in or departures from the
courtroom by the emcee should always be accompanied by chants of,
"Here come de judge" or some similar, but tasteful, chant. Bag that
"Oyez, oyez" crap. Totally retro.
The emcee should be strict with witnesses, eliminating all dry and
boring testimony like that tedious "scientific" stuff about DNA. How-
ever, audiences enjoy the exposure of lies by the lawyers, so witnesses
should be encouraged to "lie" now and then, with TV monitors ap-
prising the audience of this situation. Then the suspense will build as
viewers wait to see if the lawyers are sharp enough to expose these
falsehoods. The lawyers should engage in less petty bickering than in
the Simpson trial-dullsville-but should have an occasional serious
blowup with lots of shouting and really vile personal epithets.
Fistfights among the lawyers should be saved for sweeps month.
(Note to casting: Let's try to find some female lawyers with a little
more sex appeal than that witch Marcia Clark.) (Note to Marcia:
Marcia, baby... I loved the topless shots. Kudos to your agent for that
one!)
Another feature of the Simpson trial that could be improved
upon: While it's great to have envelopes with secret evidence in them,
both the presentation and the use of this evidence was straight from
Duckburg. Instead of just having some clod hand the envelope to the
judge, it would be better if, with alarms and excursions off camera, a
courier dashed into the courtroom with the envelope held high. The
judge could then place it in a prominent position and never open it
during the trial. Then, after the verdict, the judge could dramatically
open the envelope, and judge and audience would have a good laugh if
it showed that the result of the trial should have been different.
In summary, mouseketeers, let's keep those mouse ears pricked
for the main chance and try to keep our tails out of the wringer.
Happy Trials!
Attention, readers! The above memo is fiction . . . for now.
However, in the eyes of the American public, it represents the ex-
treme toward which the criminal trial-the symbolic centerpiece of
our criminal justice system-is rapidly evolving.
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Public criticism of lawyers and judges is not, of course, a modern
phenomenon.2 However, recent celebrated criminal cases, including
the Bobbitt, Colin Ferguson, Hinckley, McMartin, Menendez, Oliver
North, William Kennedy Smith and von Bulow cases, as well as the
multiple criminal trials following the beating of Rodney King, have
severely battered the public's image of the criminal justice system.
Even mainstream mass-circulation publications like Readers' Digest
regularly lament the system's failings.'
The O.J. Simpson trial has only made matters worse. According
to a post-Simpson-case poll, fifty-one percent of Los Angeles County
residents said their confidence in the criminal justice system had de-
creased as a result of the trial, while only nine percent said it had
increased. Overall, when asked whether they had "a great deal, quite
a lot, only some, or very little" confidence in the system, thirty-six
percent* answered "very little"; only twenty-six percent said they had
"a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence.4 Among African Ameri-
cans and Latinos, confidence was even lower.5 The A.B.A. Journal
found similar results nationwide in a poll taken during the Simpson
trial. Furthermore, a CNN/USA Today Gallup Poll showed that
eighty-two percent of respondents thought the criminal justice system,
as reflected by the Simpson trial, had broken down.7
We believe the public's response is the most important legacy of
the O.J. Simpson trial. The Simpson case cannot provide us with the
answers to questions about the best way to select juries, or the most
effective rules of evidence or the ethical boundaries of lawyers' behav-
ior. Within the broad range of criminal trials, the Simpson case is so
aberrant that it does not even represent a very useful piece of empiri-
cal evidence about such matters. Moreover, since we do not know,
and may never know, the real truth about who killed Nicole Brown
Simpson and Ronald Goldman, it would be dangerous to use the
Simpson case-even if it were typical rather than aberrant-to draw
2. "Dissatisfaction with the administration of justice is as old as law." Roscoe Pound, The
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With the Administration of Justice, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 729, 729
(1906).
3. See Steven J. Adler, Why Our Jury System Is in Trouble, READER'S DIGEST, Dec. 1994,
at 55.
4. See Cathleen Decker, Fairness in Justice System Drops, in The Simpson Legacy: Los
Angeles Times Special Report, L.A. TniEs, Oct. 8, 1995, at S2.
5. Id.
6. See Don J. DeBenedictis, The National Verdict, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1994, at 52-53.
7. See Dissatisfied-And Bored-With Judicial System, USA TODAY, June 12, 1995, at
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conclusions about particular criminal procedure rules and their useful-
ness (or lack thereof) in the "search for truth." The proper way to
draw such conclusions is on the basis of sound empirical science, not
anecdotal evidence, despite many inherent difficulties in studying
criminal trials. 8
What is most important about the O.J. Simpson trial is the central
role it has played in the loss of public respect for, and trust in, our
criminal justice system. We believe that the Simpson case should
serve as a wake-up call; an opportunity for serious soul-searching by
all of us-lawyers, judges, legislators and legal academics-who are
involved in the administration and study of the criminal justice system.
We also believe that the primary end-product of this soul-searching
should be a renewed effort to include the viewpoint of ordinary
American citizens in the ongoing dialogue about the best way to con-
duct criminal trials. 9 This effort is essential because a criminal justice
system cannot long endure if it loses touch with the deeply held values
of its society.
We must remember that criminal trials serve more than one pur-
pose. The first and most obvious purpose of criminal trials is to
"search for truth."'" We want the innocent to be acquitted and the
guilty to be convicted. Much of what we do before, during and even
after criminal trials is quite appropriately designed to further this
"search for truth."
But criminal trials also serve another very important purpose:
They express our society's deepest shared notions of institutional jus-
tice and fair play. In the words of Peter Arenella, "criminal procedure
can perform a legitimation function by resolving state-citizen disputes
in a manner that commands the community's respect for the fairness
8. For an interesting and helpful discussion of some of the problems in using empirical
data to inform legal decision-making, see J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific Juris-
prudence: The Supreme Court and Psychology, 66 IND. L.J. 137 (1990).
9. The same sentiment was recently expressed by American Bar Association President
Roberta Cooper Ramo: "The justice system doesn't belong to lawyers, it belongs to all the peo-
ple in America. Our job is to explain to the American public that what we do is right and to
listen to them to make sure that those things we do wrong are changed." Michelle Mahoney,
New Mexico Woman Taking ABA Helm, DENy. POST, May 10, 1995, at F1 (emphasis added).
10. See JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE
(1949); Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth. An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031
(1975).
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of its processes as well as the reliability of its outcomes."" Criminal
trials remind us all of the procedural and substantive values that we
hold dear. Criminal trials represent public, highly visible, morality
plays, through which order and balance are restored to a community
that has suffered an often grievous loss. However, true restoration
can occur only through criminal trials that are perceived to be just and
fair. As Barbara Babcock has written:
Trials can bring "community catharsis," but to do so they must serve
not only the substance but also "the appearance of justice." This
language brings to the surface the communicative purposes of crimi-
nal trials.... [T]he trial is an important occasion for dramatic enact-
ment, the symbolic representation of the community's most deeply
held values. On the one hand, we desire the reassurance of safety
and the satisfaction of revenge.... On the other hand, we require
the reaffirmation of our individualist values, of the separateness and
sanctity of every individual; these are the values expressed in the
rights and restrictions, even the "technicalities," embedded in our
criminal procedure. The criminal trial, as the most vivid and visible
intersection of state and individual, simultaneously affirms the
needs of both our collective and separate selves.' 2
In short, criminal trials are a form of civic theater that allows us to
define who we are as a people, helps to educate all of us about that
definition and provides us with an opportunity to foster our self-confi-
dence in the fundamental morality of our society. 13
11. Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Bur-
ger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEo. L.J. 185, 188 (1983). In the same article, Arenella
explains:
Criminal procedure can... attempt to justify the state's use of coercion by articulating
fair process norms that place some substantive and procedural limits on the state's ex-
ericse [sic] of power.
Some of these fair process norms (e.g., compelling proof of guilt.. .) are valued in
part because of their instrumental effect on the system's outcome. These process norms
contribute to good results-the reliable conviction of the guilty and the exoneration of
the innocent.... But, "in legal ordering man does not live by results alone." Criminal
procedure also articulates fair process norms that have value independent of their "re-
suit-efficacy."... The content of these dignitary norms should reflect society's norma-
tive aspirations, embodied in its positive laws, customs, religions, and ideologies about
the proper relationship between the individual and the state. Some of these fair pro-
cess norms (e.g., grand jury review...) also promote political values like community
participation .... Finally, some of these norms also reflect procedural values (e.g.,
procedural regularity... ) that underlie society's conception of the rule of law.
Id. at 200-01 (footnotes omitted).
12. Barbara A. Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assist.
ance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1140 (1982).
13. See also William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for
Truth? A Progress Report, 68 WAsH. U. L.Q. 1, 17 (1990) ("[T]he ceremonial or dramatic ele-
ments of a trial ... have caused trials to be compared to theatrical events .... The theater
metaphor is legitimate, I think, because criminal trials are and are intended to be richly symbolic
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In our view, the American criminal justice system seems to be
teetering on the brink of completely losing the public's trust. In part,
this loss of trust results because the public perceives the system to be
administered in ways that are inimical to the "search for truth." In
part, it is because the public sometimes deeply disagrees with the sys-
tem's basic definitions of "justice" and "fairness." Either way, how-
ever, when criminal trials are viewed more as entertainment and
lawyer make-work than as a just and fair "search for truth," then the
system has failed in its symbolic, cathartic purpose.
We find the loss of trust in the criminal justice system especially
unfortunate at this particular moment in our history, when our faith
in, and the influence of, other institutions-such as our government,
our schools, the family, churches and even the preeminent position of
America in the world-have also recently declined. For example, in
1966, forty-two percent of Americans had a "great deal" of confidence
in Congress, forty-one percent in the Executive Branch, fifty-five per-
cent in major companies, and seventy-three percent in medicine. By
contrast, in 1994, the figures were eight percent (Congress), twelve
percent (the Executive Branch), nineteen percent (major companies),
and twenty-three percent (medicine).14 As Americans gradually lose
confidence in these other institutions, they tend-notwithstanding
widespread disdain for lawyers-to turn more quickly and frequently
to "the law" to solve their problems. As John Updike has observed,
we have become a nation in which "rights" take precedence over "du-
ties."'" We do not trust corporations to act responsibly toward the
environment or to build safe products. Instead, we rely on laws that
force them to act. We do not trust government agencies either, sub-
jecting them to a variety of constraints, such as imposing school inte-
gration requirements on the states and freedom of information laws
on all levels of government. We use laws to keep religion out of the
and educational-that is part of their function in a society governed by the rule of law .... ");
Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts III & IV, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 920,
969 (1987) ("The determination of factual guilt or innocence is the overt function of a criminal
trial .... Criminal trials also serve other purposes .... [T]he criminal trial's quality as ritual
drama is vital to the denunciatory function of criminal justice.").
One commentator has even gone so far as to argue recently that "[t]he appearance of jus-
tice, accurate or not, may be more important than justice itself." David A. Harris, The Appear-
ance of Justice: Court TV, Conventional Television, and Public Understanding of the Criminal
Justice System, 35 ARiz. L. REv. 785, 786 (1993).
14. Robert J. Samuelson, Great Expectations, The Good Life and Its Discontents, NEws-
WEEK, Jan. 8, 1996, at 24, 32.
15. John Updike, The 50's: Each Man Was an Island, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 3, 1994, at 36, 37.
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schools, to limit television advertising, to make public accommoda-
tions accessible to disabled people and to ensure that women have
access to abortion services. We even use laws as a primary method for
settling disputes among neighbors, friends and family. It is hardly sur-
prising that the United States today not only has more lawyers per
capita than any other country, it also has nearly four times as many
lawyers as it did forty years ago.'6
Law (in the formal sense) has become the predominant external
influence over how we conduct our affairs. 17 We have become, now
more than ever, a nation of individuals, which, lacking a common
ethnicity, religion and cultural heritage, relies on a formal system of
laws to bind them together. The large supply of lawyers in this coun-
try did not just happen. It was a response to a demand for legal serv-
ices.' 8 We depend on lawyers to create and vindicate our strongly felt
individual rights because we cannot be governed by a group ethic, as
more homogeneous countries may be. It is thus critically important
that Americans have faith in our legal system, for it is one of the few
ties that allow us to remain a unified "country" rather than a collec-
tion of mutually hostile racial, ethnic, religious and economic groups.
Empirical research by E. Allan Lind and Tom R. Tyler has
demonstrated that perceptions of fairness of the legal system can di-
rectly affect public compliance with laws, voting, protest conduct and
16. There were approximately 222,000 lawyers in the United States in 1951. By 1991, that
number had expanded to approximately 805,000. Compare DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STA-
TISTICAL ABsTRAcr OF TIH UNITED STATES, 155 (1970) with DEPARTmENT OF COMMERCE, STA-
TIsTiCAL ABs-Tcr OF TmE UNITED STATES, 212 (1995). The number of lawyers per capita
more than doubled during the same period. See BARBARA A. CuRRAN & CLARA N. CARSON,
SUPPLEMENT TO THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN 1988 1
(1991).
17. For a detailed discussion of this point, see Craig Bradley, The Rule of Law in an Unruly
Age, 71 IND. L.J. 949 (1996).
18. At least one noted critic of typical claims about American litigiousness, Marc Galanter,
has pointed out that the increase in demand for legal services appears to be a worldwide phe-
nomenon. See Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71
DENrv. U. L. Rv. 77, 80 (1983) ("The number of lawyers has been increasing everywhere-in
many places at a faster rate than in the United States."). Even Galanter acknowledges, however,
that the United States has long been, and continues to be, a world leader in the number of
lawyers per capita. See id. at 80-81 ("America is a highly legalized society that relies on law and
courts to do many things that other industrial democracies do differently. For a long time the
United States has supported far higher numbers of lawyers per capita than nations with compa-
rable economies. There is no reason to think American lawyers are less efficient than their
counterparts elsewhere, although it appears they are due to the dispersal of wealth, the fragmen-
tation of authority, the absence of traditional elites or other reasons.... However, the United
States' lawyer total [sic] compare with those of others, we do have more lawyers and many
lament this condition.") id. at app. (summarizing comparative statistics on lawyers per capita).
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general participation in institutional activities. 9 As Fred W. Friendly
has put it, "Law is nothing unless close behind it stands a warm living
public opinion."20
On a self-interested level, if we lawyers do not act to put our own
house in order, legislative bodies (often led by non-lawyer representa-
tives) will likely do it for us in ways that will be damaging not only to
the legal profession, but to the rights of individuals who have legiti-
mate claims to vindicate. 21 In the tort law context, the Indiana legisla-
ture recently fired a salvo limiting total damages for medical
malpractice to $750,000, even if the plaintiff/victim was crippled for
life and would face out-of-pocket medical expenses of much more
than that amount over his or her lifetime.22
Some of the problems of the American criminal justice system
are obvious, but largely uncorrectable by changes in the system itself.
We are a nation with a crime rate vastly higher than other western
democracies. As such, our criminal justice system is overburdened.
We lack sufficient police to capture criminals, as well as lawyers and
judges to try them and prisons to house them. Such fundamental so-
cial problems are primarily the responsibilities of the nation's legisla-
tive and executive bodies and are beyond the scope of this Article.
But there are things that can be done to better the public's per-
ception of the criminal justice system, without simultaneously dimin-
ishing the system's ability to perform its truth-seeking function.
Much of the trouble with public perception stems from the fact
that the criminal justice system of the 1990s has been designed exclu-
sively by lawyers for lawyers. Law is a unique institution in that the
rulemakers, the participants and the rule-enforcers are all lawyers.
Laws and lawyers serve as major checks on the operation of other
societal institutions, such as medicine, business and government. But
lawyers, who frequently serve in legislatures, dominate legislative
staffs and hold a virtual monopoly within the court system, make al-
most all of the rules that govern lawyers. Lawyers (that is, judges and
19. E. ALLAN LND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUS-
TicE 211 (1988).
20. Fred W. Friendly, On Judging the Judges, in STATE CoURTS: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE
FuTuRE 70, 76 (National Center for State Courts, 1978).
21. V. Robert Payant, President of the National Judicial College, recently cautioned: "Law-
yers, judges and the legal profession should take the lead in this [reform]. We are the people
with the experience, knowledge and expertise. Anytime politics are added, there are dangers."
Mark Curriden, Jury Reform, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1995, at 72, 73.
22. IND. CODE ANN. § 27-12-14-3 (Bums 1994).
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bar disciplinary committees) are also responsible for enforcing those
rules. Of course, lawyers are not completely unchecked. For exam-
ple, as previously noted, legislatures sometimes impose rules that most
lawyers oppose. But most of the time, the legal system-unlike hospi-
tals, corporations and government agencies-is regulated by the same
people who operate within that system; namely, lawyers.
This self-governance of the legal profession produces a predict-
able overemphasis on procedure (the way a particular decision gets
made), often to the near-exclusion of substance (the outcome of that
decision), in any discussion about reform of the legal system. Lawyers
may differ (and often do) on what procedures are best, and even on
how much "process" is "due" in any particular situation. But one
thing that is common to lawyers-and not nearly as common in al-
most any other group in society-is a strong belief in the transcendent
value of procedure. Indeed, we lawyers often behave as if we believe
that procedure is even more important than substance.
Contributing to this overemphasis on procedure is the difficulty
in evaluating the outcome of many of the decisions made within the
legal system. As Richard Wasserstrom has noted,2 3 when a doctor is
deciding whether to perform surgery for cancer or rely on chemother-
apy, at least the goal is clear: curing the patient. Similarly, we can
usually test governmental or business decisions by their outcomes. If
a new drug cures more people than it harms, or if a certain feature
sells more cars, then the decision to implement those changes is
good.24 By contrast, if, as a result of evidentiary exclusion or effective
cross-examination of a witness, a defendant is acquitted or a plaintiff
wins a tort suit, is that result "good" or "bad"? We cannot easily tell.
Even assuming that we can determine (by empirical research) the ef-
fect that a proposed legal reform would have on conviction rates, is
the decision to implement that reform "good" or "bad"? Again, we
cannot tell. So, unable to evaluate such results in a meaningful way,
we strive to create a procedural system that we hope and believe will
lead to "good" results. The trend in criminal justice over the last forty
23. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTs. 1, 14-
15 (1975).
24. Of course, it can often be hard to tell whether the outcome of a medical, business or
governmental decision is "good" or "bad" when more than one value is at stake. For instance, a
medical decision might help the patient survive, but with considerable pain and suffering. Or a
business decision to change a car's design might produce more sales, but with a greater risk of
harm to consumers. Nevertheless, even in these cases, it is easy to evaluate the decision in terms
of each particular value; the only hard part is balancing the competing values against each other.
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years has been constantly to refine our procedures in a vain quest for
consistently "good" results-the achievement of which cannot be eas-
ily known. In our view, we have succeeded in planting so many proce-
dural trees that the sun of "justice" often can no longer shine through
the forest.25
Our constitutional structure itself is also partly responsible for the
overemphasis on procedure in lawyers' discussions about the criminal
justice system. The U.S. Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl
Warren took an especially hard look at state criminal justice systems
in the early 1960s and did not like what it saw-questionable police
tactics and frequent mistreatment of minorities.26 But the Court did
not perceive its proper role to be simply to reverse individual state
convictions because the prosecutor had withheld exculpatory informa-
tion,27 or because an accused had not been informed of the accused's
constitutional rights before being questioned by the police.28
Instead, using the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights, the
Court set out to ensure that the government followed proper proce-
dures from the beginning to the end of every criminal case. Thus,
numerous requirements were placed on police investigations and on
trials, including, most significantly, the requirement that almost every
criminal defendant have a lawyer.29 This, the Court believed, would
advance the dual goals of the criminal justice system-achieving a cor-
rect result in a proceeding that was fundamentally fair.
The Court was, in large measure, correct. No informed person
would seriously claim that criminal trials today are less fair, or are less
likely to produce a correct result, than in the 1950s.
However, whenever courts (as opposed to legislatures) undertake
to create detailed bodies of rules-as the Warren Court did in the
criminal procedure area during the 1960s-there are potential
problems. Perhaps the biggest problem is what has been called the
25. This reflects the broader trend in modem society, exemplified by government programs
such as the "var on Poverty," to attempt to right all social wrongs. For a discussion of this
phenomenon, see SAMUELSON, supra note 14.
26. For a discussion on these developments see CRAIG M. BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION (1993).
27. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
28. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
29. See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (defendant has a constitutional right to a
lawyer in every case in which imprisonment is imposed). In order to help ensure that state trials
would be conducted according to the newly required federal procedures, the Court also ex-
panded the jurisdiction of the federal courts to review state convictions. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391 (1963) (expanding federal habeas jurisdiction).
1996] 1277
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:1267
"Uncertainty Principle. '3 ° This principle holds that new rules created
by courts tend to engender more uncertainty than they resolve. This
is because courts are constrained to promulgate new rules through the
traditional common law method of deciding individual cases on their
unique facts. The common law method is not forward-looking, but
instead relies on the application and extension of prior judicial hold-
ings to new facts. A narrow rule based on the facts of one case will
not suit the next case and will have to be expanded or contracted or
distinguished, depending on the inclination of the court in the later
case.31 Unless the later case is strictly limited to answering an un-
resolved question from the first case, without trying to limit or expand
the first holding (which, in the Supreme Court, it rarely is), the two
cases together will raise new issues about the meaning of the first case
that were not previously apparent. Each of these new uncertainties
will give rise to new arguments as to how the rule should be construed
in subsequent cases, etc.
In contrast, legislatively created rules, which are unhindered,
both in their inception and in their amendment, by stare decisis, and
which are not limited to resolving present "cases or controversies,"
can often reduce uncertainty.32 To the extent that legislative rules an-
ticipate future cases in advance, and establish clear rules for handling
such cases, they can reduce the volume of litigation. To be sure, such
rules are not themselves free from gray areas and poor fits in unantici-
pated cases, but they are less prone to such problems than court-made
rules.
We believe that codified rules governing police investigations
would give vastly better guidance than a series of thirty- to forty-page
Supreme Court decisions declared over a period of some thirty-five
years, complete with concurring and dissenting opinions. This better
30. BRADLEY, supra note 26, at 62-83. Originally published as The Uncertainty Principle in
the Supreme Court, 1986 Dura L.J. 1.
31. Other problems with Court-made rules, such as the way they are affected by stare deci-
sis, are set forth in BRADLEY, id.
32. This observation is also true, of course, for judicial rules created in a manner resem-
bling legislative rules. Perhaps the best example of such a "forward-looking," "bright-line" judi-
cial rule is the one created by the Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Although
there is still considerable litigation about the scope and application of Miranda, there is undoubt-
edly less than would have resulted from a continuation of the case-by-case "voluntariness" ap-
proach of the pre-Miranda era.
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guidance would in turn make both the police and the citizenry more
confident about distinguishing proper from improper behavior.33
Detailed rules governing trial procedure are a different matter.
Unlike police investigations, trials are conducted by a neutral party,
the judge, whose job it is to ensure fairness and just results. While
inequities certainly occur at trials every day, in our view the cost of
trying to eliminate these inequities by detailed rules has rendered tri-
als so complex that, not only has the search for truth been compro-
mised, but the very fairness that was the goal of these procedural rules
has been somewhat diminished in actuality, and greatly compromised
in public perception.
To cite but one example, there is no doubt that peremptory chal-
lenges were unfairly used to exclude qualified jurors because of their
race.34 This led the Supreme Court to hold, in Batson v. Kentucky,35
that if a trial judge concluded that a prosecutor might be using per-
emptories for this purpose, the prosecutor could be required to offer a
race-neutral explanation for his challenges.
To ensure fairness, the Court later extended this rule to peremp-
tory challenges by criminal defendants36 and then to civil litigants as
well. To ensure more fairness, the rule was extended to challenges
of jurors based on gender.38 Other courts have struggled with
whether to extend the rule to challenges arguably based on other
characteristics of prospective jurors.39 The result of all this procedural
"fairness" is a trial within the trial, which may extend the process of
choosing the jury for days, and which has no direct bearing on the
33. However, as discussed in text accompanying notes 69-73, infra, we would temper this
increased and more detailed rulemaking with a discretionary exclusionary rule that would avoid
the most unpopular (and, to many, illogical) aspect of the current system. That is, the fact that
crucial evidence is suppressed where the police rule violation was minor, or even impossible to
avoid. See, eg., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), where a voluntarily confessed rapist
had his conviction reversed because the police had not given him a series of warnings that were
not required until the Miranda case itself.
34. Indeed, the unfairness that inheres in peremptory challenges, as well as their tendency
to prolong the voir dire, has led us to urge their abandonment. See text accompanying notes 51-
53, infra.
35. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
36. McCollum v. Georgia, 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
37. Edmonson v. Leesville Optical Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1992).
38. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1988) (Batson rule applies to
exclusion of Italian-Americans); State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993) (rejecting, in split
decision, extension of Batson rule to exclusion based on religion); State v. Everett, 472 N.W.2d
864 (Minn. 1991) (rejecting extension of Batson rule to exclusion based on age).
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reason for the trial in the first place-to determine the defendant's
guilt.40
Trials have become showplaces of "fair procedures," which means
that they have become places where lawyers can display their artistry.
Thus, we have lengthy attorney-conducted voir dires, numerous legal
objections to admission of evidence, largely unlimited time allotted to
lawyers to conduct direct and cross-examinations of witnesses and ex-
tended opening and closing arguments. The public, less enamored of
impressive lawyering (that is, aggressive use of procedures) and more
interested in the achievement of a just and fair result (that is, sub-
stance-whether that result happens to be guilt or innocence), is un-
derstandably disturbed and this bodes ill for the system's future. We
think that now that trial courts have become much better educated as
to what constitutes a "fair trial," we might be better served by remov-
ing those procedural constraints that are seen by the public more as
"affirmative action for lawyers" than as advancing the system's true
goals.
To summarize, the criminal trial must advance the "search for
truth," but it must also satisfy society that it is a "just and fair" trial.
The presence of television in the courtroom, as in the O.J. Simpson
case, often serves to expose irrationalities in the system to public view
and criticism. Much of what the public finds most objectionable about
the system falls within the general category of procedural rules that
the public, correctly, does not see as either part of the "search for
truth" or essential to a fair trial.
The legal profession's standard response to this problem, which
has surfaced again since the O.J. Simpson trial, is to say that the
American public just doesn't understand the realities of the criminal
trial and the importance of all of the procedures that have been cre-
ated (mostly since the 1960s) to safeguard the Bill of Rights.4 ' We
40. We recognize that, especially in the situation dealt with by Batson itself, excluding all or
most jurors of the defendant's own race from the jury may well lead to an unjust result and will
certainly lead to a trial that appears unfair. We would solve this problem by eliminating not only
peremptory challenges, but attorney conducted voir dire altogether.
41. For instance, Alan Dershowitz, one of O.J Simpson's lawyers and a famous law profes-
sor, was asked by CNN why 82% of Americans surveyed in a CNN/USA Today poll believed
that the Simpson verdict showed that the criminal justice system had "broken down." His reply:
Well, it's mostly because of ignorance. I think that any American who really wants to
appreciate the American criminal justice system should travel abroad and see that our
system really is the envy of the world. It's not broken. It needs some minor repair but
on balance I would say about the American criminal justice system what Winston
Churchill once said about democracy, it may be the worst possible system except for all
the others.
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believe that this response, while understandable (and at least partially
correct), is inadequate. We prefer the forthright approach suggested
recently by Merrill Astin Tarlton, Chair of the "Beyond the Breaking
Point" Task Force for the Law Practice Management Section of the
A.B.A.: "It is time, as a result of... a public process, that [w]e restruc-
ture America's justice system to focus again on justice-not entertain-
ment, not bureaucracy, not the selling of dispensation, not the process
at the expense of the solution, not the law-justice."42
We certainly do not contend that the criminal justice system
should be altered to fit the changing day-to-day tastes of the Ameri-
can public. Such tastes (as might be expressed in public opinion polls
or on television talk shows) are far too fickle and susceptible to influ-
ence by demagogues and media sensationalists. Rather, what we must
strive to restore to the criminal justice system is its connection with
the most deeply held values of American society-the shared conven-
tions about fairness and justice by which most of us lead our daily
lives.43
There follows a brief discussion of some specific aspects of the
criminal justice system that are not essential to, and often are in direct
conflict with, the search for truth while at the same time not substan-
tially advancing the overarching goal of just and fair trials. In our
view, the negative public image of the criminal justice system is based
in part on the fact that the public correctly perceives that many such
practices occur. In other words, if trials came closer to achieving the
due process ideal, rather than providing a forum for lawyers to
demonstrate their skills, "public perception" would take care of itself.
We emphasize that these brief suggestions are intended as start-
ing points for discussion, not as final prescriptions for reform. But we
The Late Edition: The O.J. Simpson Trial and the Justice System, (CNN television broadcast, Oct.
1, 1995).
42. Merrilyn A. Tarlton, in Is the Legal Profession on the Trash Heap?, Bus. & Soc'y REv.,
June 22, 1995, at 14.
43. For most of our nation's history, the Supreme Court tested state criminal trial proce-
dures against a single constitutional benchmark that was largely based-in theory, if not always
in practice-on such societal conventions. The due process standard of "fundamental fairness,"
applied case by case, looked to the "immutable principles of justice as conceived by a civilized
society," see Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), and princi-
ples that were "fundamental to the American scheme of justice," see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968). This relationship between society's shared norms and values and the Court's
constitutional criminal procedure jurisprudence, however, has gradually weakened. Since the
heyday of incorporation, criminal procedure law has been cast adrift from its societal moorings,
becoming more and more a set of technical legal doctrines crafted by and for lawyers.
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urge that in considering reform of the criminal trial, the concept of
fundamental societal consensus be returned to its proper place at the
center of the analysis.
I. DISCOVERY
In recent years there has been a movement in some states toward
opening up pretrial discovery on both sides." This action is good but
should become much more widespread. Since the public rightly be-
lieves that the criminal trial is supposed to be primarily a "search for
truth" rather than a "sporting event, '45 every reasonable effort to
make relevant information available to both sides should be
undertaken.46
In particular, we can see no good reason to resist adopting an
"open file" policy under which each side would presumptively enjoy
access to the other side's case files. For example, in the English crimi-
nal justice system the prosecution must turn over any materials bear-
ing on the case (whether or not it will be used at trial), any witness
statements or summaries of the facts, a witness list (complete with
names and addresses) of all persons believed to have material evi-
dence (whether or not they will be called at trial) and impeachment
evidence on anticipated prosecution witnesses.47 There are longstand-
ing concerns about subjecting crime victims to threats from defend-
ants who find out their identity in discovery, but these concerns can be
dealt with in the context of a presumption that all evidence is discov-
erable absent a showing by the prosecution of a "paramount interest
in nondisclosure," as is the law in Indiana.4 s Similarly, it does not
seem an undue burden on a defendant's right against self-incrimina-
tion to require the defendant to be similarly forthcoming. 4
44. See Brennan, supra note 13, at 10-11. For a detailed discussion of discovery by both
prosecution and defense, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§§ 19.3-19.4 (1984).
45. But see Babcock, supra note 12, at 1135-36 (arguing that the "metaphor of the sporting
event... aids one's understanding of the requirements of the adversary system.").
46. Justice Brennan was long a proponent of this view. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The
Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279; Brennan,
supra note 13.
47. See Brennan, supra note 13, at 15-16. See generally ARcHMOLD, PLEADING, EVIDENCE
& PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES 328-33 (Stephen Mitchell, P.J. Richardson & John H. Buzzard
eds., 1985).
48. Bernard v. State, 230 N.E.2d 536, 540 (Ind. 1967).
49. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (upholding that state's alibi notice law).
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 12.1 is similar. However, these notice provisions can only
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II. JURY SELECTION
The choosing of the jury presents perhaps the most egregious ex-
ample of the adversary system run amok. Lawyers are allowed to use
peremptory challenges to exclude apparently competent and reason-
able jurors-who have already been determined to be free of bias
under the Sixth Amendment-because a psychological profile pre-
pared by a jury consultant suggests that another juror in the venire
would be more likely to be biased in favor of their client. The lawyers
exclude jurors for this reason (assuming the client can afford it) be-
cause they feel bound to do everything possible, not to ensure a fair
trial, but to achieve a favorable result for their client. In the end, if
the lawyers for both sides do their jobs well, then the selected jurors
turn out to be no more fair than the first twelve qualified and unbi-
ased people who walk in the door; if both sides do not, however, then
either the prosecution or the defense obtains a jury skewed in their
favor. The system-of the lawyers, by the lawyers, and for the law-
yers-not only allows, but seems to encourage such tactics. As in any
war, if one side gets a new weapon, the other side wants it too. Conse-
quently, in cases like the O.J. Simpson case, both sides use jury con-
sultants, leading to an excruciatingly prolonged process of jury
selection.
A system that is more just, both in appearance and in reality,
would drastically curtail this process. Voir dire should be conducted
primarily by the judge and limited to very few questions designed to
ferret out bias among prospective jurors. 50 Peremptory challenges,
which readily lend themselves to abuse based on racial5' or gender
discrimination,52 as well as pure arbitrariness, should be abolished.53
be triggered by a prosecutorial request, rather than being a necessary part of the discovery pro-
cess. As a result, it was the policy in the U.S. Attorney's Office in Washington D.C. when I
worked there never to use this provision and thus avoid its requirement of reciprocal discovery.
(C.B.).
50. Currently, FED. R. Cmi. P. 24(a) provides that the judge may conduct voir dire. This
should be mandatory.
51. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
52. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
53. Several prominent judges and academic commentators have previously proposed abol-
ishing peremptory challenges. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 107-08 (Marshall, J., concurring);
Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the
Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. Rav. 153, 199-211 (1989); Akhil R. Amar, Note, Choosing
Representatives by Lottery Voting, 93 YALE L.J. 1283, 1287-89 (1984).
Our approach, emphasizing the viewpoint of the average citizen, likely would not support
the more ambitious proposal made by some commentators to select juries (at least in some
cases) in a manner consciously designed to achieve racial balance. See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson,
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Juror questionnaires, which are the "meat and potatoes" of jury con-
sultants, should be prohibited.5 4 These changes (which for the most
part have been implemented without apparent difficulty in England55)
would largely eliminate jury consultants from the jury selection pro-
cess, 56 speed up the trial and help convince jurors and spectators alike
that the system is designed to choose an impartial jury, rather than a
jury whose impartiality, if it exists, is merely a side-effect of lawyer
combat. 7
Streamlining jury selection would go a long way toward making
criminal trials more efficient. If trials were more efficient, we would
have the resources to try more cases and engage less often in the cyni-
cal and destructive process of plea bargaining, whereby the defendant
gives up the constitutional right to a trial and pleads guilty to a lesser
crime than he actually committed. 8
Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 Mic. L. Rav. 1611, 1695-1700 (1985). Johnson's propo-
sal would likely be seen as an example of the same kind of lawyerly procedural rule that the non-
lawyer public generally finds undesirable. But see Nancy J. King, The Effects of Race-Conscious
Jury Selection on Public Confidence in the Fairness of Jury Proceedings: An Empirical Puzzle, 31
AM. Caim. L. REV. 1177 (1994) (pointing out that empirical evidence is sparse and unclear, and
suggesting further research to determine whether race-conscious jury selection might increase,
rather than undermine, public confidence in the jury system).
54. Once voir dire is given over primarily to the judge, and peremptory challenges are
abolished, there would seem to be no remaining need for juror questionnaires. Their prohibition
would also help to address growing concerns about the privacy rights of those who are called for
jury duty. See Nancy J. King, Nameless Justice: The Case for More Routine Use of Anonymous
Juries in Criminal Trials, 49 VAND. L. REv. 123 (1996); Mark Curriden, Now Jurors May Have a
Right to Remain Silent, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1995, at 74, 75 (describing Texas prospective juror who
was ordered jailed after refusing to answer 12 out of 110 questions on juror questionnaire on the
ground that she considered it "intrusive" and "violative of her privacy"; the objectionable ques-
tions related to her family income, religious and political affiliations, and television viewing
habits).
55. See Samuel J. Cohen, The Regulation of Peremptory Challenges in the United States and
England, 6 B.U. INT'L L.J. 287, 304-08 (1988) (describing in general the English jury selection
process). Under the English system, lawyers are not permitted to question jurors prior to their
selection, id. at 306, and the peremptory challenge was abolished by statute in 1988, id. at 308.
However, the 1988 statute did not abolish a related procedure called "standby," under which a
prospective juror can be asked by the prosecution to wait until there are no more jurors avail-
able before the prosecution must identify the reason for the challenge. Id. at 306.
56. Some jury consultants admit that they may be more useful in helping lawyers prepare
their litigation strategies for trial than in helping to select juries. See Maura Dolan, Role of Jury
Consultants Controversial and Extensive, L.A. TIMas, Sept. 26, 1994, at Al, A18.
57. This proposal is discussed in more detail in Craig M. Bradley, Reforming the Criminal
Trial, 68 IND. L.i. 659 (1993).
58. These, and other ways to make the trial more efficient, are discussed in Id. at 659-64.
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III. THE RIGHT TO SILENCE
The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, enshrined
in the Fifth Amendment, is one of our fundamental rights and a bas-
tion against an inquisitorial system of criminal justice. Very few
Americans would want to live in a society where an accused person
would have to choose between taking the stand and admitting guilt,
lying and thereby facing a perjury charge or going to jail for contempt
of court.59 Yet neither the language of the Fifth Amendment6° nor the
common-sense views of average Americans dictate that a defendant
who declines to take the stand (like O.J. Simpson) must be completely
protected against all negative effects that might flow from a decision
to remain silent in the face of criminal charges. Although a federal
statute has long prohibited any comment on a defendant's decision
not to take the stand in the defendant's own defense, it was not until
1965, in Griffin v. California,61 that the Supreme Court held that such
comment was proscribed by the "spirit" of the Fifth Amendment. The
Court's decision explicitly acknowledged, but ultimately purported
not to be influenced by, the rather obvious fact that "the inference of
guilt for failure to testify is in any event natural and irresistible.... "62
One of the authors of this Article has previously argued against
overruling Griffin and allowing comment on a defendant's silence at
trial. 63 We agree with most average Americans that it is generally de-
sirable to encourage defendants to testify, and that a defendant's si-
lence is often probative evidence of the defendant's guilt. The
problem is that as long as the main reason for a defendant not testify-
ing is the fear of impeachment with what would otherwise be inadmis-
sible prior convictions, it is inappropriate for the prosecutor to claim
59. This "cruel trilemma" was recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Murphy v. Water-
front Comm'r of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). See generally Louis M. Seidman,
Rubashov's Question: Self-Incrimination and the Problem of Coerced Preferences, 2 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 149 (1990) (exploring the promise and limits of a consequentialist approach, focusing
on the process by which ends are determined and the means by which ends are achieved in
relation to the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination); William J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimi-
nation and Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1227 (1988) (exploring excuse-principles and self-protec-
tion against perjury under the Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination).
60. The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be "compelled ... to be a witness
against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1.
61. 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965).
62. Id. at 614.
63. See Craig M. Bradley, Griffin v. California: Still Viable After All These Years, 79 MICH.
L. Rnv. 1290 (1981).
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(or the jury to infer) that the defendant did not testify because of
guilt.
The tough issue we must confront is whether it is simply too prej-
udicial, as a general matter, to admit a defendant's prior convictions
against the defendant. When an armed robbery defendant has three
previous armed robbery convictions, such previous convictions do
tend to make most people believe (and rightly so as a matter of statis-
tical probability) that it is more likely that the defendant committed
the crime in question. Yet it also seems unfair for someone who may
now be a totally rehabilitated, productive, law-abiding member of so-
ciety to be subject to a permanently increased risk of criminal convic-
tion because of a crime committed in the past.
No matter how we decide to strike the balance concerning admis-
sibility of prior convictions, we believe that the current system, under
which the fear of impeachment discourages defendants from testify-
ing, is flawed. We should either forbid prosecutorial use of prior con-
victions at trial64 or allow such use whether or not the defendant
testifies.65 If the defendant were thus unfettered in the decision
whether to testify, it would then be appropriate for the prosecutor to
comment adversely on (and the jury to draw inferences from) the de-
fendant's silence, unless the defendant were able to satisfy the court
that such silence was justified by some exceptional circumstance (such
as where the defendant's physical or mental condition might make it
difficult for the defendant to testify in a credible manner).
As with discovery and jury selection, England has recently re-
formed its criminal justice system with respect to the right to silence.66
Under a 1994 statute, a defendant's silence-either during police
questioning or at trial-can provoke negative comment by the prose-
cutor and support an inference of guilt.67 The English judge, however,
retains discretion to absolve the defendant from the duty to testify if
64. This should be subject to the narrow exceptions currently in place, such as where prior
acts show motive or a common scheme.
65. Included in this decision would be such subissues as whether certain kinds of prior
convictions should be treated differently (because of their unusually prejudicial impact) from
other kinds of prior convictions, and what relationship-if any-should be required between the
prior convictions and the current crime before admissibility would be warranted.
66. See Gregory W. O'Reilly, England Limits the Right to Silence and Moves Towards an
Inquisitorial System of Justice, 85 J. Cnui. L. & CIMINOLOoY 402 (1994).
67. Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 §§ 34-35, in 3 CURRENT LAW STATUTEs
1994 at 33-42 to 33-46 (1995).
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the judge is persuaded that the defendant has a good reason for re-
maining silent.68  Although the current English system is not quite
what we would propose, given its failure to address the tough issue of
admitting prior convictions, these recent English reforms support our
overall conclusion that the Griffin rule is not necessarily an inherent
component of a "just and fair" trial.
IV. EVIDENTIARY ADMISSIBILITY
A. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The exclusion of relevant evidence because of police misbehavior
in obtaining it is another feature of the criminal trial that is unfathom-
able to the public because it is often inconsistent with the "search for
truth." As we lawyers know, exclusion does advance another impor-
tant goal: deterrence of police misconduct, which most people would
support.69 But to the extent that police failure to obey the rules is a
result of the "rules" being unclear or even undeclared, the public is
justifiably outraged.70 For example, even civil libertarians must have
been a little unsettled when the Supreme Court reversed the convic-
tion of (voluntarily) confessed rapist Ernesto Miranda because the po-
lice failed to give him a series of warnings that were not required until
the Court wrote its famous opinion in his case.71
A more limited exclusionary principle under which the trial judge
weighs, case by case, the gravity of the police misdeed and the cost to
68. Id. at § 35(5)(b).
69. Cf. Ronald J. Bacigal, Putting the People Back into the Fourth Amendment, 62 GEO.
WAsH. L. REv. 359 (1994) (advocating use of pretrial juries, or parallel civil juries, to resolve
Fourth Amendment legal issues). Bacigal bases his argument (at least in part) on the idea that
"[p]lacing search-and-seizure law within the exclusive domain of the judiciary gives rise to the
cynical, but accurate, observation that in 'legal interpretation there is only one school and at-
tendance is mandatory.'" Id. at 428. Bacigal's proposal, on the other hand, would "serve a
democratic function by testing various policies and practices of the government against the com-
munity's political-moral directives." Id. at 430. "Under my proposed model ... the legal dia-
logue over liberty and security in society need not be closed off ipse dixit with the latest Supreme
Court decision. Instead .... judges, legislators, and administrators ... could benefit from a
systematic accounting ofjuries' perceptions of reasonable searches and seizures." Id at 428; see
also Akhil R. Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994) (sug-
gesting replacing Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule with damages awarded by civil juries).
Although we do not necessarily agree with Bacigal's specific proposals, we share his funda-
mental belief that the views of "the people" should be given greater weight in "legal dialogue."
In our opinion, this should be so not only in Fourth Amendment law, but throughout the general
realm of criminal procedure law.
70. The need for clearer and more comprehensive rules of criminal procedure is the theme
of BRADLEY, supra note 26.
71. Id. at 28-30 (discussing the public outcry surrounding the Miranda decision).
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the system of using tainted evidence against the cost of exclusion,
would likely find more public support. The current "automatic exclu-
sion" system sometimes lets the guilty go free due to excusable police
misdeeds. At other times it leads courts, trying to avoid exclusion, to
claim that no constitutional violation existed when a seventh grader
could see that, by the rules under which the police operated, a clear
violation had occurred. In Western Europe, Canada and Australia,
the mandatory exclusionary rule is eschewed and a more flexible dis-
cretionary rule is employed instead.72 We should perhaps follow their
lead.
B. KEEPING OTHER EVIDENCE FROM THE JURY
Despite the fact that much time is lavished on choosing the jury,
and much ink is devoted to exalting that body as a mighty bastion of
liberty, lawyers often do not trust jurors.73 Consequently, elaborate
rules have been devised to keep relevant evidence from the jury on
the ground that it might be too prejudicial.
The hearsay rule, with its multiple, hypertechnical exceptions, ex-
emplifies this complexity. If we trust jurors, then we should generally
let them hear such evidence while reminding them that it may be less
reliable than other evidence. Presumably, it was belief in the common
sense of the jury that partly led us to use it in the first place. It is not
worth the time, confusion and loss of juror and public goodwill to
have lawyers constantly holding bench conferences to debate
technical evidentiary issues while the jury cools its heels74 or to
72. Id. at 95-143.
73. Laura Gaston Dooley has recently written a provocative essay in which she argues that
modem "cultural ambivalence" about the jury may be a reflection of fundamental power strug-
gles between a privileged, mostly white, mostly male-dominated class of lawyers and judges and
a more democratic, multi-gendered, multi-ethnic class of jurors. She notes that the jury has been
increasingly "marginalized" by "language that frames it as feminine." Laura G. Dooley, Our
Juries, Ourselves: The Power, Perception and Politics of the Civil Jury, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 325
(1995). She argues that we should consider restoring much of the jury's historic power (which
has been stripped in recent years) to receive information and to participate actively in the trial.
Although her essay addresses primarily juries in civil cases, we can find many parallels in the
criminal context. See id. at 327-28.
74. A former Chief Justice of the Michigan Supreme Court has proposed a novel solution
to this particular problem: Let the entire criminal trial take place without the jury present, and
preserve it on videotape, so that admissibility rulings can be made by the trial judge (and even
appealed by the parties, if necessary) without fear of either tainting or boring the jury. Then,
when all sides have exhausted their arguments about what should be on the videotape, select a
jury and let them decide the case based on the videotape. See Thomas E. Brennan, Video Justice,
DALLAS MORN NG NEWs, June 11, 1995, at 1J.
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reverse convictions due to errors on evidentiary matters.75 A system
that leaves jurors feeling that they have not been able to find out
enough information to render a just verdict on all the evidence fails to
instill public confidence in that system.
If we do not trust the jury any more, then let us abolish the jury
system 76 and go to the Continental model. In this system, the trial is
conducted largely by the judge (though lawyers can also question wit-
nesses and make arguments), and guilt is decided by a mixed panel of
judges and lay persons. This panel has access to all of the evidence,
but must justify its result in a detailed written judgment from which,
for example, improperly used evidence must be excluded.77 In our
view, it would be better to have shorter, "summary" trials for all de-
fendants than to have full-blown trials that are so procedurally con-
strained and time-consuming that they can be afforded only to a small
minority of defendants.78
V. THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
A. THE USE OF EXPERT WrrNESSES
Another prime example of the excesses of the adversarial system
is the treatment of expert witnesses. An expert should be a neutral
witness paid by the court to provide independent advice. Instead, our
experts are scientific paladins who gallop toward each other from the
75. For example, in the recent case of Williamson v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2431 (1994),
the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the defendant's conviction because a nontestifying co-felon's
hearsay statement, which was largely a statement against the declarant's penal interest and
hence admissible under FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3), could not be used against the defendant insofar
as it tended to cast blame on him. However, the Court could not muster a majority for the entire
opinion. The mere fact that there is a Rule 804(b)(3), with the complexity and prolixity that that
number suggests, ought to signal to reasonable people that something may be amiss.
76. Moving the states to the Continental model would not require a constitutional amend-
ment, but simply the reversal of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968). At the least, we should consider abandoning jury trials for misdemeanor cases.
Currently, Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), requires jury trials if imprisonment for six
months or more is authorized, even if the defendant is not actually to be imprisoned at all.
Among the civilized, democratic countries that have eliminated jury trials in criminal cases
are India and Japan. See Laura Mansneras, Under Fire, Jury System Faces Overhaul, N.Y. TIMEs,
Nov. 4, 1995, § 1 (National Report), at 9. Even in Britain, from whence our love for the jury
system sprang, "only 1% of civil trials and 5% of criminal trials are heard by juries." Id.
77. See Bradley, supra note 57, at 659, and sources cited therein.
78. Summary non-jury trials, based on defense waivers of the right to trial by jury, have
been a common practice in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, and at least one commentator has ar-
gued that such a system has numerous advantages over one that places heavy reliance on plea-
bargaining. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 H~A.v. L. REv. 1037
(1984).
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extreme ends of their discipline to see who will prevail in combat. As
John Langbein has observed:
The European jurist who visits the United States . . . expresses
amazement ... bordering on disbelief when he discovers that we
extend the sphere of partisan control to the selection and prepara-
tion of experts. In the Continental tradition experts are selected
and commissioned by the court, although with great attention to
safeguarding party interests. In the German system, experts are not
even called as witnesses. They are thought of as "judges aides.",79
By comparison, American experts are chosen and paid by the op-
posing parties. Of course, these "experts" will be hired only if it is
anticipated that they will be partisan and, as Langbein points out from
his own experience as an expert witness, the pressure to be biased
toward your "side" is powerful. "The more measured and impartial
an expert is, the less likely he is to be used by either side." 80 Such
"trial by combat" of expert witnesses, where one insists that gray is
white and the other that it is black, may possibly end up with a just
result, but we are skeptical, and so are many who study jury behav-
ior.8' The system definitely does not enhance public faith in the pro-
cess. Nor, for that matter, does it do much good for the public
perception of those professions (such as psychology or even medicine
in general) from which expert witnesses are commonly drawn.
B. THE ROLE OF THE TRIAL JUDGE
Another aspect of evidence presentation which the Europeans
may have found a better way of dealing with is the direct examination
of witnesses. In Germany, for example, it is the trial judge who gener-
ally serves as the "examiner-in-chief," conducting the direct examina-
tion.8 The lawyer for whose side the witness is testifying may ask
79. John Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Cmi. L. REV. 823,835
(1985). Although Langbein was discussing civil trials, the Continental approach to criminal cases
is similar. Moreover, although Langbein acknowledged the differences between criminal and
civil litigation, including the desire to "over-protect" defendants in criminal cases, he also noted
his own disagreement with the proposition that "adversary procedure is a particularly effective
way to implement our concern for safeguard in the criminal process." See id. at 842-43 & n.70.
80. Id. at 835.
81. See, for example, the comments of Thomas Munsterman, Director of the Center for
Jury Studies at the National Center for State Courts, discussing the results of jury exit question-
naires: "If there is one expert who says yes and another expert that says no, the jurors basically
tune out the experts. They say, if these two learned people, both being recognized by this court
as experts, can't agree, what are we to do? Maybe we'll just base it on something else." Barbara
Bradley, DNA: 'Blood Evidence, WASH. TimEs, Apr. 24, 1995, § Insight, at 9.
82. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY 62 (1977).
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questions only after the judge has concluded.83 Adopting some vari-
ant of this approach in the United States would largely eliminate the
opportunity for lawyers to try to "coach" or "steer" their witnesses on
the stand and would also reduce the number of evidentiary objections
and the risk of repetitious questioning.
In general, the trial judge is an under-utilized resource whose role
currently is largely limited to "refereeing" the attorneys. If the trial
judge were more active, both in ensuring that the jury hears the full
story and in limiting "sporting contest" behavior by attorneys, the
criminal trial would be greatly improved.
C. THE ROLE OF THE JURY
Arizona has recently adopted a set of innovative rules designed
to improve the jury's understanding and retention of the evidence
presented to it. These new rules will, among other things, allow jurors
to ask questions of the witnesses (by submitting them in writing to the
judge who will screen them and, if they are not improper, pose them
to the witnesses), take notes, discuss the evidence among themselves
during the trial and engage in dialogue with the judge during delibera-
tions should they feel the need for further instructions or even argu-
ments from the lawyers.84 We applaud such experiments, which are
consistent not only with the public's view of how trials should be con-
ducted, but also with empirical evidence about effective jury decision-
making.8 s
83. This would not be barred by Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961), which recog-
nizes the right of the defendant to be examined directly (but not necessarily exclusively) by the
defendant's own lawyer.
84. See Curriden, supra note 21, at 75-76.
85. See id. at 76 (quoting Arizona Supreme Court Chief Justice Stanley Feldman: "While
many of these things sound radical, they are not based on mere intuition. They are based on the
latest studies of how people digest information.").
University of Delaware Professor Valerie Hans, a noted jury expert and author of Judging
the Jury, has explained the current situation this way:
I say to my students, "Okay, imagine you have to take a midterm exam.... You have
to sit there for several months. You are not allowed to take notes. You cannot ask any
questions if you are confused-you have to allow other people to ask questions for you,
and of course they may not ask the ones you were concerned about .. " It really
brings it home to them how antiquated this system is.
Barbara Bradley, Juries and Justice" Is the System Obsolete?, WASH. TimS, Apr. 24, 1995, § In-
sight, at 6.
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VI. PLEA-BARGAINING
Perhaps the least popular facet of the criminal justice system in
the eyes of the American public is the widespread practice of plea-
bargaining. Approved (in general) by the U.S. Supreme Court in
1978,86 plea-bargaining is common in nearly all American jurisdic-
tions. Plea-bargaining is widespread for a variety of reasons, including
(in some jurisdictions) caseload pressure, the need to "settle" weak or
tainted cases and the desire to agree on a "proper" sentence that
might differ from the one that would likely be imposed after a full-
blown trial.8 7 But the public perceives plea bargaining to be nothing
more than a rank sell-out, an exchange of richly deserved prison time
for a few dollars (and hours) saved by the prosecution. The public
gets so upset by this practice that some prosecutors have adopted poli-
cies against it,ss and in California a constitutional amendment was
passed to ban it. 9
If criminal trials were made less elaborate and costly (as in some
of the ways we have already suggested) it might be possible to elimi-
nate plea-bargaining completely (at least to the extent it is motivated
by economic considerations). 90 Failing this challenge, we make the
following alternative suggestion: We should try to separate the legiti-
mate purposes of plea-bargaining from the illegitimate purposes. If
86. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
87. For the definitive empirical study of plea-bargaining and the motivations of prosecu-
tors, defense attorneys, and judges for engaging in it, see MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING
(1977).
88. See, eg., Michael L. Rubenstein & Teresa J. White, Plea Bargaining: Can Alaska Live
Without It?, 62 JUDICATURE 266 (1978-79).
89. The constitutional amendment, Proposition 8 (otherwise known as the "Victim's Bill of
Rights"), was approved on June 8, 1982. See CAL. CONsT. art I, § 28 (1982); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1192.7 (West Supp. 1996); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1732.5 (West Supp. 1996). Perhaps
unsurprisingly, Proposition 8 did not have the desired effect of eliminating plea-bargaining in
California. This is because the measure, which purported to ban plea-bargaining in all serious
felonies, applied only while those felony cases were pending in superior court, and not during the
initial period when most felony charges were filed in municipal court. Candace McCoy, in an
extensive study of proposition 8, concluded that this loophole permitted prosecutors and defense
attorneys to adapt by conducting plea-bargaining before serious felony cases were transferred to
superior court. See CANDACE McCoY, POLITICS AND PLEA BARGAINING: VcIM's RIITrrs IN
CALIFORNIA 37-38 (1993); Jeff Brown, Politics and Plea Bargaining: Victim's Rights in California,
45 HASTINGS L.J. 697, 699-701 (1994) (book review).
90. In 1983 Albert Alschuler concluded that three-day jury trials could be provided for all
felony defendants for no more than $850 million more than is presently spent on the criminal
justice system. See Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial.
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 936, 948 (1983).
1292
THE "SEARCH FOR TRUTH"
caseload pressure is a problem in a jurisdiction, or the prosecutor sim-
ply wants to offer defendants an incentive to avoid costly trials, then
we should create (by statute if necessary) a standardized schedule of
sentencing "discounts" available to all defendants who are willing to
plead guilty to the original charges filed against them. This method
will not only help satisfy the general public (who, as taxpayers, will
readily appreciate the concept of the "discount"), but will also help
explain the apparently disparate treatment of otherwise similarly situ-
ated defendants. On the other hand, where the motivation for plea-
bargaining is to settle weak cases, then the prosecutor should not be
encouraged to engage in such plea-bargaining. The same should hold
true for the desire to avoid overly punitive sentences that might be
imposed after a full-blown trial. These motivations should be viewed
as illegitimate bases for plea-bargaining. A prosecutor should be re-
quired to file whatever charges he or she believes the defendant mer-
its at the outset, and should not be allowed to "negotiate" a drop in
those charges or a discretionary reduction in the defendant's
sentence.91
VII. VICTIM IMPACT TESTIMONY AT SENTENCING
One of the most popular tenets of the modem "victims' rights
movement" has been the right of victims (or their survivors) to make
statements at sentencing about the impact the crime has made on their
lives. The offered justifications for such a right include the victims'
ability to bring out facts that might otherwise go unnoticed, their de-
sire to influence the sentence imposed and their emotional need to
confront the convicted defendant and to express their anger and
moral indignation in open court. So long as these so-called "victim
impact statements" are not given undue weight by the sentencer (who,
in non-capital cases, is usually the judge), we see no reason why vic-
tims should not be allowed to exercise this right.9 Perhaps some vic-
tims will choose to remain silent and get on with rebuilding their lives,
91. See John H. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78
MicH. L. REv. 204, 211 (1979).
92. For a thoughtful critique of the use of victim impact statements, as well as other aspects
of the "victims' rights movement," see Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37
STA. L. REv. 937 (1985). We agree with Henderson that "victims' rights" are often asserted
cynically by those with conservative political agendas. At the same time, we do not believe that
the expressed desires of victims themselves should be dismissed on grounds that we, or the peo-
ple who run the legal system, know better than they what will be good for them-especially
when "they" are a diverse group with differing needs and desires. But see, Joachim Hermann,
Bargaining Justice-A Bargain for German Criminal Justice, 53 U. Prrr L. REv. 755, 756 (1992)
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or will prefer to extend mercy to the person who has harmed them.
Others, however, may obtain some psychic benefit from the sense
(real or imagined) that they may regain part of their lost autonomy by
exerting the right to participate (even in a minor way) in the defend-
ant's sentencing. Who, other than the victims themselves, should
claim the right to decide such a question on their behalf? If the con-
victed defendant is aggrieved by victims' participation at sentencing,
so be it-we see it as a form of "psychic restitution," in which the
defendant gives up something in order to help restore some victims to
their pre-crime state of mind. Moreover, these victims' sense of vindi-
cation would likely extend to the general public as well.
Our view does not necessarily extend to the propriety of using
"victim impact statements" in capital cases where the sentencing issue
is often more emotionally charged and always more important than in
non-capital cases. This issue has reached the U.S. Supreme Court
three times; 93 present federal constitutional law allows at least the lim-
ited use of "victim impact statements" in capital cases, 94 although the
states are split on their use as a matter of state law. 5
VIII. APPEALS
Consistent with the way the rest of our criminal justice system is
designed, our system of appellate review often seems to focus too
much on procedure and not enough on substance. We should think
seriously about changing the system in two important respects. First,
we should generally open the doors of the appellate courthouse to all
colorable claims of actual innocence. State procedural barriers like
the one invoked by Texas in the notorious capital case of Herrera v.
(noting that, by the nineties, "plea-bargaining takes place in roughly twenty to thirty percent of
all cases").
Victims are not monolithic. For some, healing and even reconciliation are attainable,
However, for others, particularly the victims of the most serious crimes, nothing can
give them what they want-to be victims no longer. Each new chance to exert control
or to affect punishment becomes virtually an obligation to seek justice for a lost loved
one or to continue a quest for wholeness.
Robert P. Mosteller, Popular Justice, 109 HARV. L. REv. 487, 494 (1995) (book review).
93. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 816-30 (1991) (overruling South Carolina v.
Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), and Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987)).
94. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 830 n.2 (overruling prior cases and allowing use of testimony
dealing with victims' personal characteristics and impact of murder on victims' survivors, but
declining to address use of survivors' opinions about crime, defendant and appropriate
sentence).
95. See, eg., Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928 (1994) (holding victim impact evidence gener-
ally inadmissible under Indiana constitution).
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Collins,9 6 barring a convicted defendant from raising "newly discov-
ered evidence" more than thirty days after the conclusion of the trial,
should generally give way to the overriding importance of the "search
for truth. '97 Second, we should continue the Supreme Court's recent
trend in the direction of expanding the use of "harmless error" rules.98
Such rules help to ensure that substantively valid convictions are not
overturned based on procedural mistakes that likely did not affect the
outcome, and can thus somewhat ameliorate the entire problem of
procedural over-emphasis discussed in this Article. For example, we
should recognize that mistakes in jury instructions, which (as everyone
who has ever tried a case knows) cannot be fully comprehended even
by the most attentive juror,99 should almost always be "harmless" un-
less the mistake also gives rise to improper attorney arguments.
IX. HABEAS CORPUS
Habeas corpus is a remedy that goes back hundreds of years in
Anglo-American jurisprudence (it was an important part of the
Magna Carta and is expressly guaranteed, at least in its common law
form, by the Constitution). The "Great Writ" provides vital protec-
tion for our civil liberties and should not lightly be curtailed. How-
ever, recent congressional and presidential statements indicate that
the "Great Writ" may be in jeopardy, at least in connection with re-
view of state capital cases. Severe time limits, scope restrictions and
other limitations are on the potential legislative horizon. It is time to
reexamine the purposes of habeas corpus and determine how to fit the
"Great Writ" into our modern criminal justice system.
We think the American public will readily understand and appre-
ciate the need for habeas corpus, so long as that need can be tied
96. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
97. Here, we might learn something useful from our neighbors across the Pacific. In Japan,
the system of appellate review discourages procedural claims, but is relatively hospitable to fac-
tual claims based on new evidence or some other indication of factual innocence. See Daniel H.
Foote, "The Door That Never Opens"?: Capital Punishment and Post-Conviction Review of
Death Sentences in the United States andJapan, 19 BRoOK,. J. INT'L L. 367,421-22,471-77 (1993).
98. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (establishing "beyond reasonable doubt"
standard for finding constitutional error "harmless" on direct appeal); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S.
570 (1986) (identifying limited categories of errors not subject to the Chapman "harmless error"
rule); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623-24 (1993) (applying "substantial influence on
jury's verdict" standard for finding constitutional error "harmless" on federal habeas review).
99. "According to B. Michael Dann, a superior court judge in Phoenix, several studies have
shown that jurors do not understand 50 percent of the judge's instructions at the end of the
trial-the equivalent of assembling all the ingredients of a cake but failing to follow the recipe."
Bradley, supra note 85, at 10.
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directly to one of the two underlying purposes of the criminal trial-
the "search for truth" and the fulfillment of the desire for "justice."
Habeas serves the first goal by providing yet one more opportunity to
determine whether an innocent person was erroneously convicted. It
serves the second goal to the extent that federal habeas review helps
to deter state courts (which always get the first chance to examine the
defendant's claims) from ignoring constitutional rights. Our proposed
approach, then, is to limit habeas corpus relief to two kinds of situa-
tions: (1) where the petitioner can make out a colorable claim of fac-
tual innocence (with or without a corresponding claim of procedural
error at his trial), and (2) where the state courts have unreasonably
denied the petitioner's constitutional claim and thus need to be sent a
deterrence message.10 We would deny habeas review in all other
cases. For example, when a state trial court makes a disputed but rea-
sonable decision about the constitutionality of admitting a challenged
confession, and that decision is upheld by other state courts (also act-
ing reasonably) on direct appeal, we would not allow further litigation
in federal habeas of the same constitutional issue unless the defendant
can make out a colorable claim of factual innocence ("I did not com-
mit the crime") as opposed to legal innocence ("I would not have
been convicted without the confession").' 0'
X. LAWYER ETHICS
In many respects, lawyer ethics is the most difficult subject of all.
A large part of the public's disdain for lawyers, and for the criminal
justice system in general, can be attributed to the perception that law-
yers are simply too adversarial, seeking to "win at all costs" without
regard to the "truth" or the interests of the larger society. We cer-
tainly do not want to suggest that the adversarial system itself should
be rejected, or that lawyers should be told that they should regularly
pursue either the "truth" or society's best interests at the expense of
the interests of their clients.
100. See Joseph L. Hoffmann & William J. Stuntz, Habeas After the Revolution, 1993 Sup.
CT. REv. 65, 69.
101. The U.S. Supreme Court has already taken a step in a similar direction by expanding
the definition of "harmless error" in habeas cases. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619
(1993). But we prefer our proposal for two reasons: first, a "harmless error" rule (even as ex-
panded in Brecht v. Abrahamson) focuses on legal innocence, while our proposal would focus on
factual innocence; and second, a "harmless error" rule applies even to cases where the state
courts acted "unreasonably" in denying constitutional claims, a situation where we believe that
federal habeas review and reversal of the conviction can serve an important deterrence goal.
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At the same time, we believe that many in the legal profession
have for too long avoided confronting some of the difficult ethical
questions that attach to the roles of prosecutor and, especially, de-
fense counsel. °2 The legal profession has generally chosen the easy
road, imposing on itself the relatively simple task (in ethical terms) of
pursuing clients' interests as vigorously as humanly possible without
running afoul of any of the specific provisions set out in statutes or
ethical codes like the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Lawyers
have even further simplified their lives by tending to define their cli-
ents' interests in narrow, short-term ways; lawyers need think only in
terms of what will produce a conviction or an acquittal, rather than in
terms of what might be best for the long-term interests of both their
clients and society at large. This process of sharp role-differentiation
allows lawyers effectively to separate their human nature (which rec-
ognizes the social harm sometimes caused by the actions of lawyers)
from their professional role (which involves the freedom to act in a
largely amoral fashion without worrying about the social
consequences).
Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz, a prominent commen-
tator on the legal system and a member of O.J. Simpson's defense
team, recently made the following classic statement of the defense
lawyer's role-differentiation:
FSF [interviewer]: Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes once said
that a good lawyer helps his clients not to evade the law, but to obey
it.
AD [Dershowitz]: Yeah, well, that's the kind of thing lawyers say,
but that's not realistic. That's not what lawyers do. Lawyers help
their clients evade the law.
FSF: So is that your definition of a good lawyer?
AD:... Basically, I have one job when I take on a criminal case-
to help my client get the lowest possible sentence or get acquitted. I
would never lie for a client, and I would never allow a client to lie or
to break a rule in helping himself get acquitted. But if I can get him
off, consistent with my legal and ethical obligations, that's my goal.
And so, for example .... I have nothing but praise for Leslie Ab-
ramson for having pulled the wool over the eyes of the Menendez
juries, which hung when they should have convicted. I have nothing
102. The ethical responsibilities we discuss herein apply equally to both prosecutors and
defense lawyers; however, given that prosecutors already have a well-established ethical respon-
sibility to do justice, not merely pursue a "victory" for their "client," defense lawyers will tend to
be more frequently confronted with the kinds of ethical dilemmas we discuss herein than will
their prosecutorial counterparts.
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but praise for Lisa Kemler, the lawyer for Lorena Bobbitt, who
achieved a sensational acquittal by reason of insanity for her cold,
guilty client. But I have nothing but contempt for the stupid jurors
who fell for those lawyers' brilliant advocacy. And I have nothing
but contempt for the rules of law that allow that result to be
achieved. Now, I'm furious, personally, with the results in both of
those cases. I'd be furious if William Kuntsler [Note by authors-
Kuntsler died shortly after the Dershowitz interview] managed to
get Colin Ferguson off on the grounds of black rage; that would be a
horrible decision. But I'd have nothing but praise for him as an
advocate and a lawyer. He'd be doing his job. °3
To many lawyers, Dershowitz' words undoubtedly constitute a
persuasive defense of the "adversary model" of criminal justice. To
the public, however-including the "stupid jurors" and the (presuma-
bly stupid) legislators who helped write the "rules of law"-his words
express exactly what is most disturbing about the legal profession.
Moreover, lest it seem that defense lawyers are the only ones suscepti-
ble to amoral adversarial excesses based on role-differentiation, con-
sider the words of Maurice Nadjari, a prosecutor, who once told
fellow prosecutors at a national forum that their "true purpose is to
convict the guilty man who sits at the defense table, and to go for the
jugular as viciously and rapidly as possible .... You must never forget
that your goal is total annihilation.' 110 4
There are many specific issues in criminal cases that might pres-
ent challenging ethical dilemmas-if only lawyers were not so good at
sidestepping such dilemmas. In a fascinating article (written before
the O.J. Simpson trial), David Luban identified a number of specific
practices that might help a defense lawyer's client obtain an acquittal
and that do not violate any formal rules, but might nevertheless be
unethical. They include:
Arguing that the evidence supports a conclusion that you know is
false....
Impeaching a witness known to be testifying truthfully ....
Hear no evil: ensuring that the client and witnesses never tell the
defender inconvenient facts-facts the knowledge of which would
103. Frederica S. Friedman, The Law in a Whole New Light, INTERVIEW MAO., Sept. 1994,
at 118, 121. Although we have concerns about the views expressed by Dershowitz regarding
lawyer ethics, we agree with his (implicit) suggestion that the rules of criminal procedure law
should be changed to make fancy lawyering less influential in criminal trials.
104. MARIN E. FRANY.E, PARTIsAN JusaicE 32 (1980) (quoting Maurice Nadjari, Selec-
tion of the Jury (Voir Dire), Lecture to the National College of District Attorneys, University of
Houston (Summer 1971)).
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turn useful things a defender might say to the prosecutor into
lies....
If it has some factual basis, and I don't know it's false, I can treat it as
true: offering convenient arguments or assertions, occasionally
hedged with "might" or "could" or "possibly" or "probably," that
are not lies because the defender does not actually know that they
are false, though she has reason to suspect that they are.105
On a recent National Public Radio show, Stephen Gillers talked
about a (fictional) case involving the last two of these practices.1 6
The famous movie, "Anatomy of a Murder,"'01 7 contains a scene in
which Jimmy Stewart tells Ben Gazzara the four defenses to murder,
and why three of them could not be true in his case. Stewart then asks
Gazzara whether the fourth defense is true-namely, insanity. Gaz-
zara immediately replies, "I was mad. I was insane at that time." This
information, deliberately elicited, allows Stewart to assert the insanity
defense without violating his ethical duty not to facilitate perjury. Gil-
lers explained that not only do real-world lawyers often behave like
Stewart, but such behavior is consistent with the current ethical stan-
dards of the legal profession. 08
On the same show, the interviewer later posed a hypothetical
case: A defense lawyer is at her client's house, going through closets
and looking under beds. The client is accused of murdering someone
with a knife. The defense lawyer opens a drawer and finds a knife,
apparently overlooked by the prosecution. Should the defense lawyer
turn the knife over to the prosecution? The lawyer-participants in the
discussion agreed that the best course of action, consistent with
A.B.A. guidelines, would be to leave the knife exactly where it was
found and say nothing about it.' 9
105. David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1729, 1760-61
(1993).
106. All Things Considered: Defense Attorneys Face Difficult Challenge with Clients (Na-
tional Public Radio broadcast, July 9, 1994, Transcript # 1538-6) available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Transcript File.
107. ANATOMY OF A MURDER (Columbia Pictures, 1959).
108. See supra note 106.
109. Id. Interviewer Daniel Zwerdling then asked, "[B]ut isn't that sort of a lie, in society,
by omission?" Seymour Wishman, a retired defense lawyer, agreed, saying that such ethical
conflicts caused him to leave the defense bar. Elizabeth Semel, a current defense lawyer,
objected:
That slippery slope is exactly what leads to systems of public confessions, to the gu-
lag.... The notion that if the government cannot establish, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that my client is guilty to the satisfaction of 12 people, is something about which I feel
proud. And I feel-that is not to say that on a societal level and on a human level, that
I'm not just as concerned with people who are injured or people who are killed, but in
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Perhaps even more problematic are certain practices classified by
David Luban under the general heading of "dirty tricks":
In a different category altogether are tactics like obtaining continu-
ances in the hope of witnesses forgetting (or, to borrow a dramatic
L.A. Law plot, obtaining continuances until a terminally ill witness
dies), forum shopping, greymail, digging up dirt on the prosecutor,
appealing to a jury's racism, or the legendary Clarence Darrow tac-
tic: smoking a cigar with a wire running through it lengthwise, so
that during the prosecutor's closing argument the jury would be-
come fascinated and distracted by Darrow's ever-lengthening cigar
ash.' 10
None of the practices mentioned above would obviously violate
the ethical rules that bind the legal profession. That does not mean,
however, that these practices are ethical. Of course, we cannot say
whether, in any particular case, it would be unethical for a defense
lawyer to engage in any of these practices. Ethical issues are not eas-
ily resolved by generally applicable rules."' What we find trouble-
some is the way that the "adversary model" of criminal justice is
commonly offered up by lawyers as a simplistic justification for the
conclusion that all of these practices (and more) are not only ethically
acceptable, but desirable components of "zealous advocacy," thus
avoiding the need to grapple with the ethical issues on an individual,
case by case basis.
Why shouldn't lawyers engage in more serious, personal soul-
searching about the morality of these kinds of practices-especially,
as suggested by David Luban, if a defense lawyer is considering using
them on behalf of a client whom the lawyer knows to be guilty and
whose acquittal would not serve the collateral goals of combatting ra-
cism, class bias or procedural deficiency in the criminal justice system?
Why shouldn't criminal lawyers, on both sides of the courtroom, have
a responsibility to grapple with the thorny problem of identifying the
terms of my professional responsibility, I hope that I-that I feel proud and I hope that
I feel that I have performed a public service, as well as a personal service, to the client.
Prosecutors, of course, have an ethical obligation to dismiss a criminal prosecution if they dis-
cover evidence that would exonerate the defendant. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
110. Luban, supra note 105, at 1761.
111. This is part of the problem with the legal profession's current approach to ethical issues.
As David Luban notes, "[tlo say that a norm is discretionary does not, of course, mean that it is
standardless ... it means only that the norm indicates a range of responses to different condi-
tions and leaves the task of determining which response is appropriate in a given situation to the
actor." Id. at 1757; see also RONALD DwoRIUN, TAKING Rlfrrs SEraousLY 31-33 (2d ed. 1978)
(discussing discretion); Robert C. Post, The Management of Speech: Discretion and Rights, 1984
Sup. Cr. REv. 169.
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true "best interests" of both the defendant and the society at large?" 2
Why shouldn't prosecutors have the responsibility to consider, in
every case, whether justice (that is, the conviction of a guilty defend-
ant) or mercy (for example, an acquittal) would be more likely to turn
the defendant into a law-abiding citizen?"13 Why shouldn't defense
attorneys have the responsibility to consider, in every case, whether
defendants might be better off in the long run if defendants accepted
responsibility for their conduct and tried to make amends to the vic-
tim and society, rather than fighting for an acquittal?"14
We offer no pat answers to these kinds of questions for we be-
lieve that there are none. We suggest only that we should stop think-
ing that there are pat answers, and that we should reject the view that
our only ethical responsibility as lawyers is to conform to the adver-
sary model without violating the Model Rules or Model Code. Of
course, in an imperfect world, there will always be a need for rules and
sanctions; and it is certainly possible to draft ethical rules more tightly,
in ways that would produce better results in some of the situations we
have discussed. But we can, and should, also try harder to become
ethical human beings-not simply lawyers who are good at obeying
rules." 5 No single change would likely do more to improve the sorry
public image of lawyers than for us to acknowledge that we are human
beings with an ethical responsibility to try to "do the right thing"-
even if it sometimes means something different than we might do
under a "pure" adversarial model." 6
112. See generally William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Pro-
fessional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 29 (critically examining the "Ideology of Advocacy"); Was-
serstrom, supra note 23, at 5-15 (making the accusation that "the lawyer-client relationship
renders the lawyer at best systematically amoral and at worst more than occasionally immoral").
113. As far as prosecutors are concerned, it is widely accepted that at least some degree of
ethical balancing is required: "The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the
usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict." MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1981).
114. See George Anastaplo, Lecture, On Crime, Criminal Lawyers, and O.J. Simpson:
Plato's Gorgias Revisited, 26 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 455, 464-67 (1995).
115. See Tarlton, supra note 42: Lawyers should "redefine the profession's standards of be-
havior based on the understanding of and commitment to critical values rather than adherence
to a simple written code."
116. It might even help us to heal ourselves. A recent poll reveals that as many as seven out
of ten lawyers in California would change careers if they had the opportunity. A Rand Corpora-
tion study found that half of all lawyers would not become lawyers if they had a chance to start
over. A Johns Hopkins University study found that lawyers are more likely to be depressed than
people in 103 other occupations. And 11% of North Carolina lawyers who were polled admitted
considering suicide at least once a month. A loss of professional pride and widespread public
disdain have been offered as likely reasons for these dismal statistics. See Is the Legal Profession
on the Trash Heap?, Bus. & Soc'y REv., Summer 1995, at 14.
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We concede that this change is unlikely to take hold among prac-
ticing criminal lawyers-most of whom have been so deeply indoctri-
nated to think in terms of the "pure" adversary model that they may
be incapable of doing otherwise. Rather, this change-if it is ever to
occur-would probably have to begin, in the first instance, in the law
schools. Law professors should give their students more opportunities
to grapple with tough ethical questions, and should insist that the solu-
tions often are to be found within oneself, not in a rule book.
CONCLUSION
The legal profession and the criminal justice system have a long
way to go in order to reclaim the confidence, trust and support of an
American public that has come to see both in a decidedly negative
light. But if the O.J. Simpson trial has served to shock and shame us
lawyers into taking a hard look at ourselves and the convoluted sys-
tem we have created in order to see whether any part of the public's
disdain is warranted, then the Simpson case may someday prove to be
a turning point in modem legal history.
We want to emphasize once again, in concluding, that our pri-
mary purpose in this Article is not to answer questions, but to raise
them. Our premise is that the public's voice needs to become a louder
and more consistent component of the ongoing dialogue about the
administration of criminal trials and the criminal justice system in gen-
eral. We cannot claim to have a special insight into the public's point
of view-we have not been anointed, or even appointed, as their rep-
resentatives. We offer herein our thoughts about the direction that
public opinion is likely to push us, and about the desirability of travel-
ing down that particular road. We welcome the thoughts of others
who wish to participate in the same dialogue. Only by engaging in
such a dialogue can we begin to restore the connection between crimi-
nal trial procedure and the deeply shared norms and values of Ameri-
can society.
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